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RECENT DECISIONS 
BANKRUPTCY-FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS-VENUE FOR PLENARY ACTIONS 
UNDER SECTION 70(e)-Plaintiff trustee in bankruptcy brought a plenary 
action under section 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act1 in the Federal District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois for recovery of fraudulently 
transferred property located within the district. The defendants were citi-
zens of Illinois, except the bankrupt's daughter, a California citizen. The 
district court granted the daughter's motion to dismiss for lack of venue. 
On appeal, held, reversed and remanded. Sections 23(b)2 and 70(e)(3)3 of 
the Bankruptcy Act exclude actions under section 70(e) from the require-
ments of the general venue provision of Title 28, U.S.C.;4 in all cases under 
section 70(e) except those for monies only, venue is governed by the loca-
tion of the real or personal property in dispute. Yorke v. Frank, 295 F.2d 
580 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 818 (1962). 
Congress has implemented the broad constitutional grant of bankruptcy 
power5 by designating all United States district courts as courts of bank-
ruptcy6 and by giving them jurisdiction, inter alia, to "determine con-
troversies in relation" to bankruptcy.7 However, district court jurisdiction 
of plenary actions8 between the trustee or receiver and adverse claimants 
is generally limited to those cases where jurisdiction would have existed if 
the controversy had been between the bankrupt and the adverse claimants 
and bankruptcy had not intervened.9 Congress, in formulating section 23(b) 
1 This section empowers the trustee in bankruptcy to recover for the estate property 
transferred by the bankrupt where such transfer would be voidable by a creditor of the 
bankrupt under any applicable federal or state law. 52 Stat. 882 (1938), as amended, 
11 U.S.C. § ll0(e) (1958); see 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1f 70.90 (14th ed. 1962). 
2 "Suits by the receiver and the trustee shall be brought or prosecuted only in the 
courts where the bankrupt might have brought or prosecuted them if proceedings under 
this title had not been instituted, unless by consent of the defendant, except as provided 
in sections 60, 67, and 70 of this Act." 52 Stat. 854 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1958). 
3 "For the purpose of such recovery or of the avoidance of such transfer or obliga-
tion, where plenary proceedings are necessary, any State court which would have had 
jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened and any court of bankruptcy shall have 
concurrent jurisdiction." 52 Stat. 882 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § IIO(e)3 (1958). 
4 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1958). This section provides that in actions founded only on 
diversity venue may be laid in a district where either all plaintiffs or all defendants 
reside, "except as otherwise provided by law." Where jurisdiction is not founded solely 
on diversity, the suit may be brought only in the district where all defendants reside, 
"except as otherwise provided by law." 
Ii U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8. 
6 Bankruptcy Act § 1(10), 66 Stat. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 1(10) (1958). 
7 Bankruptcy Act § 2(a)7, 66 Stat. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § ll(a)7 (1958). 
s A summary proceeding is a relatively brief, less formal hearing conducted by the 
bankruptcy court where the dispute arises respecting property in its possession, the 
defendant consents, or the act expressly or implicitly authorizes such a proceeding. A 
plenary proceeding-an independent civil action by the trustee-is otherwise necessary. 
Central Republic Bank &: Trust Co. v. Caldwell, 58 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1932); see 2 
COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 1, ,r 23.02; Seligson &: King, Jurisdiction and Venue in 
Bankruptcy, 36 REF. J. 36, 73 (1962). 
9 Bankruptcy Act § 23(a), 52 Stat. 854 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 46(a) (1958); Bardes v. 
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of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, removed this limitation from suits by the 
trustee where consent of the defendant is obtained.10 Initial interpretation 
of section 23(b) developed along two lines. Several courts held that the 
consent clause necessarily made 23(b) a venue provision.11 Others inter-
preted consent of the defendant under 23(b) as conferring subject-matter 
jurisdiction.12 In 1934, Schumacher v. Beeler13 resolved this conflict by 
holding 23(b) to be a jurisdictional provision.14 The principal case, relying 
on authority antedating Schumacher,15 returns to the discarded venue inter-
pretation of 23(b). 
Amendments in 1903 and 1910 further narrowed the applicability of 
the jurisdictional limitation in section 23(b) by excluding from its opera-
tion actions by the trustee to avoid transfers and liens under sections 60, 
67, and 70,16 and by granting jurisdiction of these actions to "any court 
of bankruptcy"17 without the defendant's consent.18 This exception, like 
23(b) itself, concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, not merely venue;19 and 
Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524 (1900). See also Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947); 
2 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 1, 1[ 23.12; 5 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 2135 (5th ed. 1953). 
Corporate reorganization proceedings under chapter X, however, are excluded from the 
jurisdictional limitations of § 23(a). Bankruptcy Act § 102, 52 Stat. 840 (1938), 11 U.S.C. 
§ 502 (1958). 
10 52 Stat. 840 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1958); see 2 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 1, 
'ii 23.14. 
11 E.g., Matthew v. Coppin, 32 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1929); Coyle v. Duncan Spangler 
Coal Co., 288 Fed. 897 (E.D. Pa. 1923); McEldowney v. Card, 193 Fed. 475 (E.D. ';('enn. 
1911). 
12 E.g., Flanders v. Coleman, 250 U.S. 223 (1919); Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 
U.S. 524 (1900). 
13 293 U.S. 367 (1934). 
14 The Schumacher holding has received almost unanimous acceptance. Eisenrod v. 
Utley, 211 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1954); Halpert v. Engine Air Serv., Inc., 212 F.2d 860 
(2d Cir. 1954), petition for certiorari dismissed on motion of petitioner, 350 U.S. 801 (1955); 
In re Wisconsin Cent. Ry., 74 F. Supp. 85 (D. Minn. 1947); Nicholson v. Scott, 50 F. Supp. 
209 (E.D. Mich. 1943). But cf. Burnham v. Todd, 139 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1943) (dictum); 
Canright v. General Fin. Corp., 33 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Ill. 1940) (dictum). 
15 Collett v. Adams, 249 U.S. 545 (1919); Rodgers v. Bankers Commercial Co., 42 
F.2d 906 (N.D. Ill 1930); Detroit Trust Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 13 F.2d 942 (E.D. 
Mich. 1926). 
16 32 Stat. 797 (1903) and 36 Stat. 838 (1910), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1958), 
17 "Court of bankruptcy" in the context of these sections means those courts so 
designated by Congress (see note 6 supra), and not just the primary bankruptcy court. 
E.g., May v. Moss, 194 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1952). One court, however, has construed 
"any court of bankruptcy" as limiting federal jurisdiction of the subject matter to the 
courts in a district where the state tribunals would have had jurisdiction. Lawrence 
v. Lowrie, 133 Fed. 995 (M.D. Pa. 1903). 
18 Bankruptcy Act § 60(b), 36 Stat. 842 (1910), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1958) 
(voidable preferences); Bankruptcy Act § 67(e), 32 Stat. 800 (1903), as amended, 11 
U.S.C. § 107(e) (1958) (voidable liens and fraudulent conveyances); Bankruptcy Act 
§ 70(e)(3), 36 Stat. 879 (1910), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(e)(3) (1958) (voidable transfers 
and obligations). A bill recently proposed in Congress but not acted upon would remove 
this jurisdictional grant from §§ 60, 67, and 70 and replace it with a provision enabling 
the primary bankruptcy court, after due notice to all parties in interest, to exercise sum-
mary jurisdiction of actions under these sections. H.R. 4855, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). 
10 Wood v. Wilbert's Co., 226 U.S. 384 (1912). 
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at least since Schumacher the courts have looked to the provisions of 28 
U.S.C. £or rules regarding the venue of such actions.20 The error of the 
principal case in denying the applicability of the general venue provision 
of 28 U.S.C.21 to an action under section 7O(e) apparently flows from a mis-
intepretation of its principal authority, Collett v. Adams,22 which held the 
general venue provision23 inapplicable to an action £or avoidance of a pref-
erential transfer only because the suit was local within section 54 of the 
Judicial Code of 1911,2~ and not because section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act 
necessarily excludes the operation of the general venue statute. Though 
the principal case professes not to reach the question of the application 
of 28 U.S.C. section 1655,25 its leading authorities base venue in such ac-
tions squarely on the provisions for local actions in the Judicial Code of 
1911, including the predecessor of present section 1655.26 By following these 
cases the court reaches the same result as if it resorted directly to section 
1655. 
The need £or uniform application of bankruptcy laws and the prac-
tical necessity in bankruptcy proceedings of reaching property and persons 
beyond state lines were the principal reasons £or the constitutional dele-
gation of a comprehensive federal bankruptcy power.27 Attempts to limit 
federal jurisdiction in bankruptcy, however, have been frequent. Propo-
nents of enlarged state court jurisdiction in bankruptcy matters have argued 
that greater efficiency, as well as less disturbance of local debtor-creditor 
laws, would result from such a limitation of federal jurisdiction as was 
embodied in 23(b).28 Nevertheless, recurring depressions and the develop-
ment of a truly national economy have made clear the existence of a per-
vasive national interest in a £air and efficient system of bankruptcy ad-
ministration.29 Central to such a system and vital to any bankruptcy 
20 E.g., Crane v. Tannenbaum, 151 F. Supp. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Rollins v. Repper, 
69 F. Supp. 976 (E.D. Mich. 1947); Cate v. Stapleton, 43 Cal. App. 2d 492, 111 P.2d 437 
(1941); see 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note I, 1f 67.46; 5 REMINGTON, op. cit. supra note 9, 
t 2186. 
21 See note 4 supra. 
22 249 U.S. 545 (1919). 
28 As then embodied in § 51 of the Judicial Code of 1911, 36 Stat. 1101. 
H !16 Stat. 1102. 
25 This provision allows venue regardless of the residence of the parties "in an action 
in a district court to enforce any lien upon or claim to, or to remove any incumbrance 
or lien or cloud upon the title to, real or personal property within the district •••• " 
For an examination of the limitations of § 1655, see 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1!11 4.34-.41 
(2d ed. 1961). 
26 Collett v. Adams, 249 U.S. 545 (1919); Detroit Trust Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 13 
F.2d 942 (E.D. Mich. 1926). The only additional authority cited in the principal case 
is questionable precedent because of its confusion of venue with jurisdiction of the 
person. Rodgers v. Bankers' Commercial Co., 42 F.2d 906 (N.D. Ill. 1930). 
27 THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (Madison); Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Bankruptcy 
Clause, I AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 215, 220, 225 (1957); Olmstead, Bankruptcy a Commercial 
Regulation, 15 HARv. L. REv. 829, 831 (1902). 
28 31 CoNc. REc. 1785 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Henderson); see Williams v. Austrian, 
331 U.S. 642, 649 (1946); Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 374 (1934). 
29 WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 8-11 (1935). 
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proceeding is the swift and complete consolidation of all property right-
fully a part of the bankrupt's estate. Congressional recognition of the 
singular importance of this process led to the amendments of 1903 and 
1910, which excluded the trustee's actions to recover property for the estate 
from the jurisdictional limitations of 23(b). Congress thereby emphasized 
the special national interest which attaches to these important aspects of 
bankruptcy litigation.30 This confirms the Schumacher conclusion that Con-
gress intended a broad jurisdictional grant in actions by the trustee to 
avoid preferences or recover fraudulent transfers. Like reasoning suggests 
that venue in such litigation should receive an equally broad construc-
tion. Since these proceedings by their very nature concern the recovery of 
property, the courts can best facilitate the consolidation of the bankrupt's 
estate by recognizing many such actions as local within 28 U.S.C. section 
1655,31 permitting venue where the property is located and allowing the 
advantages of substituted, extraterritorial service.32 Often, as in the prin-
cipal case, much of the property the trustee seeks to recover is located in 
one district, while some or all defendants are residents of other districts 
or states. The trustee's judicious use of section 1655 in this situation will 
permit a single, comprehensive action in the district where the property 
is located,33 thus minimizing the number of suits necessary to consolidate 
the estate, accelerating the process, and reducing the cost of administration. 
Martin B. Dickinson, Jr. 
30 The express purpose of the 1903 and 1910 amendments, insofar as they affected 
§§ 60, 67, and 70, was to alter the holding in Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524 
(1900), which had properly interpreted § 23(b) as denying federal jurisdiction in such 
actions unless the defendant consented or other grounds of jurisdiction, e.g., diversity, 
were present. Thus Congress acted to insure plenary federal jurisdiction in actions under 
§§ 60, 67, and 70. 35 CONG. REc. 6941 (1902) (remarks of Rep. Ray, Chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee); see Lawrence v. Lowrie, 133 Fed. 995 (M.D. Pa. 1903). 
31 The courts have held actions by the trustee under §§ 60, 67, and 70 to be 
within 1655 even where such suits included an alternative demand for the value of the 
property. E.g., Collett v. Adams, 249 U.S. 545 (1919); Commonwealth Trust Co. v. 
Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 28 F. Supp. 586 (W.D. Pa. 1939); Detroit Trust Co. v. Ford 
Motor Co., 13 F.2d 942 (E.D. Mich. 1926). Actions by general creditors to recover fraud-
ulent transfers have seldom received such treatment. E.g., Grapette Co. v. Grapette 
Bottling Co., 102 F. Supp. 517 (D.P.R. 1952). Contra, Mellen v. Moline Malleable Iron 
Works, 131 U.S. 352 (1889). See Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 208, 234 (1953); 3 MOORE, op. cit. 
supra note 25, ~ 18.11. 
32 See Carney v. Commonwealth Oil &: Gas Co., 5 F. Supp. 304 (D. Kan. 1933). 
33 Where the action is not within § 1655, however, the trustee must usually resort 
to § 1391. See Crane v. Tannenbaum, 151 F. Supp. 725 (S.D.N,Y. 1957). 
